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Filling In the Gaps:
Extrasystemic Mechanisms for
Addressing Imbalances Between the
International Legal Operating System
and the Normative System
Charlotte Ku and Paul F Diehl
What happens when there is an imbalance between the operating and
normative systems of international law? One obvious outcome is noth-
ing; the imbalance remains, and the norms of the system are not given
full effect. For example, human rights provisions abound, but they can
be widely ignored in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. In this
article, we identify several other possibilities. Our contention is that
adaptations occur that compensate for, or at least mitigate, the effects
of the operating-normative systems imbalance. Specifically, we ex-
plore four kinds of extrasystemic (at least from the perspective of the
international legal system) adaptations: (1) actions by nongovernmen-
tal organizations and transnational networks, (2) internalization of
international law, (3) domestic legal and political processes, and (4)
"soft law" mechanisms. Our contention is that the international legal
system is partly kept functioning by these actors and mechanisms,
even though they technically fall outside the framework of the inter-
national legal system. KEYWORDS: international law, NGOs, soft law,
norms, compliance.
ebates over the legality and legitimacy of the use of force in Iraq
in 2003 are but one of the more recent examples in which the
norms of international law and the system charged with imple-
menting those norms seemed irreconcilable. This, in fact, reveals a more
general problem in international law in which norms and the capacity to
implement those norms may not be consonant. Until the international
system provides adequate capacity, states and other actors will seek ad
hoc and sometimes extrasystemic means to accomplish their ends. By
doing so, they may foster more enduring, systemwide change.
Among the most visible changes in any legal system is the adoption
of new rules or norms of behavior for its members.l In the international
legal system, these norms are often specific to a particular problem
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area. For example, the Convention Against Torture reflected the inter-
national community's consensus on outlawing certain human rights vio-
lations. Similarly, the global trade agreement emerging from the Doha
Round of negotiations may include provisions to limit the use of
national agricultural subsidies. The Kyoto Protocol sets limits for the
emission of greenhouse gases. Each of these is a component of what we
have referred to elsewhere as the "normative system," 2 or the part of the
international legal system that is quasi-legislative in character by man-
dating particular values and directing specific changes in state and other
actors' behaviors. In effect, the normative system prescribes, and more
often proscribes, certain behaviors for the subjects of international law.
The mere specification of behavioral norms does not guarantee that
the normative system will function efficiently. It cannot ensure that
those precepts will be observed even when the political will to do so
exists. There must be the appropriate processes and structures in place
to give effect to the norms. We refer to this as the "operating system."
As an operating system, international law functions as a constitution
does in a domestic legal system by setting out the consensus of its con-
stituent actors (states) on distribution of authority, responsibilities in
governing, and the units that will carry out specific functions; conven-
tionally, these are classified under sources, actors, jurisdiction, and
institutions. We chose the word operating as one would in characteriz-
ing a computer's operating system. It is the basic platform upon which
a system will operate. When the computer operating system (e.g.,
Microsoft Windows) functions to allow the use of specific word pro-
cessing programs, spreadsheets, or communications software, there is
little direct consideration given to that system by the user. Similarly, the
operating system of international law provides the signals and com-
mands that make multiple functions and modes possible, and often
requires little conscious effort.
In the ideal conception, there is symmetry between the normative
and operating systems: the latter is designed, and perfectly so, to serve
the needs of the former. Indeed, this is largely H. L. A. Hart's concep-
tion in which secondary rules serve to give effect to primary rules. 3 In
practice, we argue that this is not always the case. Norms are often cre-
ated in the legal system, but there are not always corresponding provi-
sions in the operating system to give them full effect. For example, the
genocide convention does not include provisions for universal jurisdic-
tion, and until the creation of ad hoc tribunals and the International
Criminal Court (ICC), there were no international courts to prosecute
individuals accused of genocide. The new norm may be incompatible
with the operating system or the norm may be de novo, leaving the
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operating system incapable of ensuring its application. The imbalance
goes beyond international law's centuries-old lack of centralized enforce-
ment mechanisms. It also includes limitations with respect to actors' abil-
ities to assert rights (e.g., individuals and international organizations),
lawmaking procedures, and jurisdictional rules in the operating system.
We have argued further that the operating system does not always adapt
to changes in the normative system, leading to a suboptimal imbalance
between the two systems.
4
What happens when there is an imbalance between the operating
system and the normative system? One obvious outcome is nothing; the
imbalance remains, and the norms of the system are not given full effect.
For example, human rights provisions abound but can be widely ig-
nored in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. In this article, how-
ever, we identify several other possibilities. Our contention is that adap-
tations occur that compensate for, or at least mitigate, the effects of the
operating-normative systems imbalance and may over time lead to oper-
ating system change. Specifically, we explore four kinds of extrasys-
temic 5 adaptations: (1) actions by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and transnational networks, (2) internalization of international law, (3)
domestic legal and political processes, and (4) "soft law" mechanisms.
Our contention is that the international legal system is partly kept func-
tioning by such adaptations, even though they technically fall outside
the framework of the international legal system. In making this argu-
ment, we hope to shed light on the international legal process as well
as add to the dialogue in the four areas noted.
The Operating-Normative System Imbalance
The development of a new legal norm (or the extensive modification of
an existing one) may produce changes in the international operating
system. Yet the latter is far from guaranteed. First, the extant operating
system may be able to accommodate the new norm with no changes
required. For example, a new global trade agreement may comport well
with existing World Trade Organization mechanisms, including its
forum for dispute resolution. In this way, new norms do not upset the
equilibrium between normative and operating systems.
Of central concern to this analysis is a second scenario. A new norm
may arise that necessitates a change in the operating system in order to
give the former full effect, but such a change does not occur. In earlier
work, we specified the conditions under which operating system change
would follow from a normative change. 6 We argued that the operating
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system responds to normative changes only when a response is "neces-
sary." The operating system must be incompatible, ineffective, or insuf-
ficient to give the new norm effect. For example, holding individuals
responsible for torture or other crimes (Convention Against Torture)
created new norms but is incompatible with operational rules on sover-
eign immunity; the Spanish case against General Pinochet is indicative
of this tension. Exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity may need to
be created in order for the operating system to be consonant with these
new agreements and the legal norms embedded in them.
Yet necessity is not a sufficient condition for operating system
change. Operating system change must also be roughly coterminous with
a dramatic change in the political environment (i.e., "political shock").
There is inherent inertia in any political system, and international law
has been characterized as changing more glacially than other legal sys-
tems. Accordingly, we posit that some significant impetus must be pres-
ent before the operating system adjusts to the normative change. That
impetus must come from a significant political shock. Political shocks
can be discrete events, such as world wars, acts of terrorism, natural
disasters, pandemics, or horrific human rights abuses. Shocks might
also appear as significant processes, such as global democratization or
technological revolution, that extend over a period of time and have an
impact only when a critical threshold is reached.
Political shocks may have the effect of changing the normative system
and the operating system simultaneously or sequentially. That is, an initial
political shock may prompt a normative change (e.g., restrictions on the
use of military force after World War I), and this may include correspon-
ding changes in the operating system (e.g., the creation of the League of
Nations and its provisions for dealing with aggression). In contrast, the
operating system change may not result from the same shock as that which
prompted the initial normative change. Thus, it may take another shock,
potentially many years later, for the operating system to be altered.
Even when necessity and political shocks are present, opposition
from leading states and domestic political factors might serve to block
or limit such operating system change. Change will likely not occur in
the operating system, or it might be incomplete, when such an alteration
threatens the self-interest of the dominant states and/or is actively
opposed by one or more of those states. If this change occurs without
the acquiescence of dominant states, it may prove to be sufficiently
minimal and ineffective so as not to challenge their interests. This dif-
fers from normative system change that may proceed even if dominant
states object. The necessity of consent from the dominant state(s) can,
therefore, be seen as an obstacle that needs to be overcome prior to any
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effective operating system change taking place. This limitation is not a
component of the operating system per se, defined by international legal
rules, but rather is an exogenous constraint reflective of power relation-
ships in the international legal system.
The above summary illustrates that operating system change,
although needed, may not occur. Even when alterations in the operat-
ing system take place, they may do so years after the need emerged
from the original normative change. In either case, there is a significant
imbalance between the operating and normative systems, with the net
result being that certain norms will not have effect in the system; that is,
they will not be implemented, observed, or enforced in an efficient man-
ner. What is likely to happen as a result of this imbalance? Most obvious
is nothing: the system remains out of equilibrium, and new international
legal norms have limited or no effect on behavior. Yet, another possi-
bility exists. In the following sections, we detail four different adapta-
tions by which the operating-normative system imbalance is redressed-
all outside the formal international legal system. Over time, such
adaptations may also provide the mode for operating system change.
Extrasystemic Mechanisms for Adaptation
Impetuses for Adaptation
Although disequilibrium may persist, extrasystemic mechanisms may
arise to address some or all of the gaps in the operating system. Unlike
biological systems, which may be inherently adaptive, the international
legal system requires some agency to achieve change. That is, actors
outside (e.g., NGOs) or inside (e.g., states) the legal operating system
must observe the imbalance and have incentives to redress it; such
incentives may be strategic and self-interested or they may be altruistic.
There are several broad reasons why agents may seek to provide solu-
tions to the operating-normative system imbalance.
First, actors may want to include interested parties heretofore ex-
cluded from the operating system in a particular issue area. Most often,
these interested parties are the ones who are willing to supply the mon-
itoring or enforcement capabilities needed to ensure norm compliance.
This is most evident in the human rights area in which private organi-
zations, such as Human Rights Watch, carve out roles for themselves in
reporting on human rights violations. Actors may involve such parties
for a number of reasons. Actors may already have good working rela-
tionships with interested parties (e.g., certain NGOs) and thereby feel
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more comfortable with those entities playing important roles in imple-
mentation rather than relying on traditional actors such as government
or other public entities in the international legal operating system. Some
actors (e.g., weaker states) may regard themselves as incapable (in
terms of power, resources, or expertise) to fill in the gaps and thereby
seek third parties who can fill the roles required. Interested parties may
desire to participate for altruistic reasons because they believe that their
efforts are superior to extant operating system procedures or just
because such organizations want to enhance their roles; the latter is task
expansion behavior characteristic of organizations of all varieties.
Second, the intervention of other actors may be to ensure that some
issues that are not automatically part of the existing structures and
processes are included. Actors may desire that issues concerning indige-
nous peoples, for example, be included as part of the monitoring of
environmental accords. Extrasystemic mechanisms may ensure that such
concerns are reflected in the implementation of the norm, something that
would not occur under present operating system mechanisms.
Third, actors, especially individual states, may desire greater con-
trol over the implementation of norms. Accordingly, they create struc-
tures and processes outside the international legal operating system,
perhaps even blocking efforts at operating system change. Regulation of
norms may then be left to domestic legal systems or powerful actors,
who then have some discretion (and national sovereignty) over the norm
as it affects those actors. This is important in that it shows that actors
are not always motivated by achieving greater compliance with inter-
national norms when they create mechanisms to supplement or replace
international legal procedures.
Below we identify four different adaptations by which the operating-
normative system imbalance is redressed. We should note that the out-
comes of all these processes are not necessarily a fully functioning and
effective system of norm implementation. Extrasystemic adaptations may
still leave holes in the operating system unfilled, and even when gaps are
addressed, the adaptations may be inefficient or ineffective. Still, most
adaptations have the effect of improving norm implementation and the
effect of the normative system. Several of these also have the effect of
skirting the barriers imposed by opposition to the operating system change
presented by the leading states in the international system.
NGOs and Transnational Networks
Traditionally, NGOs were involved only in the process of norm creation.
Most notably, they raised the salience of global problems and helped
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mold treaty language, albeit usually working through national delega-
tions. The prominence of women's issues on the international agenda
today and the adoption of treaties such as the landmines convention and
the Statute of the International Criminal Court are examples of strategic
NGO-state alliances that resulted from highly effective political lobby-
ing. 7 Increasingly, however, NGOs are also assisting with elements of
the operating system, particularly with the monitoring and implementa-
tion of legal instruments. 8 As treaties increasingly provide frameworks
rather than static statements of norms, NGOs have a wider range of
opportunities to influence the development of both the normative and
operating systems.
Contemporary circumstances have created opportunities for NGOs
to play more roles as a supplement or substitute to the international law
operating system. This stems, in part, from international law's shift in
focus from concerns of the state to those of the individual. Also, the
technical character of many issues now facing policymakers continues
to make them, as they have been for decades, receptive to expert infor-
mation. "New technology and the increasingly complex and technical
nature of issues of global concern not only increase decision makers
uncertainty about their policy environment but also contribute to the
diffusion of power, information, and values among states, thereby cre-
ating a hospitable environment for epistemic communities." 9 Technol-
ogy has also "broken governments' monopoly on the collection and
management of large amounts of information."' 0 Events leading up to
the signing of the convention to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines
(Ottawa convention, 1997) provided an example of the new power that
individuals linked by technology, organized into a political network, and
working in alliance with governments can wield.II Thus, some NGOs are
well positioned to assume roles in the implementation of norms, espe-
cially in those areas in which specialized expertise is required.' 2
Beyond expertise, NGOs have been directly called up to perform
operating system functions heretofore carried out by other actors. Inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) have specifically contributed to the
prominence of NGOs as they have sought to circumvent governments.
As governments seem less able or willing to meet the financial needs of
norm monitoring and compliance, IGOs have tapped the vast private
wealth available through the intermediation of NGOs. Thus, as national
governments have been less willing to carry out the duties of the oper-
ating system or support international institutions that will perform those
functions, NGOs have been called upon to fill the gap, often as "sub-
contractors" to broader IGO efforts. Perhaps most famously, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is charged with monitoring
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compliance with international humanitarian law as it relates to prisoners
of war. NGOs can also supplement government and IGO capacity in
helping to keep abreast of specific issue areas. This is important where
even the best-staffed government agencies can rarely dedicate full-time
staffs to the many issues that now constitute international affairs.
NGOs have been especially instrumental in filling operating system
gaps in human rights and the environment, issue areas in which states
needed political support and capacity "on the ground." Private organi-
zations have an advantage in that they can pursue these activities within
countries where foreign governments could not. Furthermore, the polit-
ical power and experience gained in promoting various norms continued
beyond the enactment of specific obligations to monitoring their ongo-
ing development and implementation. Given their familiarity with the
issues and the players, NGOs may in fact be more expert at monitoring
and overseeing development of norms than the formal organizations
created to do so on an official basis. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
observed that in addition to the formal governance provided by states
and the intergovernmental organizations that they created, governance
now also takes place through networks of agents that can be both pub-
lic and private and that derive credibility from their flexibility and
dynamism to address new issues with fewer start-up costs. 13
This bottom-up approach runs counter to the classical image of
international law as the product of an international conference of diplo-
mats. Yet, it has evolved as an important source of international law as
more private activity from trade to child custody moves across interna-
tional borders. This approach is not grassroots but relies on networks
of practitioners whose practice and behavior affect the content and form
of certain rules because they are the very individuals who are key to
that particular practice. This is similar to the kind of transgovernmental
network to which Anne-Marie Slaughter refers. 14 The structure of an
influential group can be informal, but the group wields influence
because it is cohesive and recognized by those who are key to the work
in a specific area. The bottom-up approach recognizes that such informal
arrangements can exist outside the government sphere and can also have
important regulatory or normative effect because the behavior will be
consistent among all who are in the network.
One example of such nongovernmental lawmaking can be found in
the letter of credit practices used by commercial banks called the Uni-
form Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. Though not law,
US courts and courts elsewhere have used this standard to resolve letter
of credit disputes. Another example is in the area of export credit insur-
ance where the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers
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adopted standards that ultimately found their way into more formal
international agreement. These are narrow and technical areas, but if we
think back to the origins of much of the UN specialized agency system
we have today, perhaps we can appreciate the importance and potential
power of such privately generated best practices and standards.
15
Another example is when civil society groups ally with intergov-
ernmental organizations to set standards and pursue initiatives that sub-
sequently are embraced by national governments but are first pursued or
articulated by private groups. This is increasingly occurring, and private
organizations remain active in the implementation of an international
convention:
- Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: two NGO alliances
are closely identified with efforts to prepare and adopt the Framework
Convention Alliance, with more than 200 NGOs in ninety-one coun-
tries, and the tobacco transnationals, made up of seventy-five groups in
fifty countries.
- Landmines convention: Jodie Williams, winner of the Nobel
Peace Prize, organized a network that was instrumental in the ratifica-
tion of the landmines convention.
- The Statute of the International Criminal Court: the two-year run-
up to the 1998 Rome intergovernmental conference on the ICC pro-
vided NGOs the opportunity to organize and build relationships with
UN secretariat staff and other key players in the drafting such that
NGOs were accepted by governments and the UN as resources and worthy
advocates. 16
- Global moratorium on driftnet fishing: although mandated only by
UN General Assembly resolutions, the global moratorium has worked in
part through the monitoring efforts of various environmental non-
governmental organizations like Greenpeace.1
7
- Corporate social responsibility standards employing techniques of
international standard setting and litigation through domestic channels:
for example, when suits are brought by private litigants in U.S. courts
under the terms of the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act as occurred against
UNOCAL for its operations in Myanmar and against Shell for opera-
tions in Nigeria. 18 Such steps indicate movement away from voluntary
standards of corporate social responsibility to international obligations
that carry legal liability and accountability. 19
The drawback to the bottom-up approach is that it assumes a devel-
oped legal and political system that is adequately mature and special-
ized to participate in the global network in a particular area. It further
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assumes that resources are available to move toward common objectives.
The bottom-up approach puts a premium on participation. As such, it can
disadvantage national legal systems that are not part of existing net-
works. The bottom-up approach at the international level, however, may
be advanced by the decentralization and privatization of public services,
such as health, and a global economy that can outpace national govern-
ments' abilities to regulate.
In addition to NGOs, we see that voluntary, transnational networks
have demonstrated their power to contribute to the operating system,
especially to influence states in the monitoring of state conduct in
the treatment of their own citizens. "Principled issue networks," as
agents for change in state behavior and even in international standards,
have emerged from the increased level of private transnational activity.
Made possible through resources provided by foundations, spurred on
by the commitment of individuals, and held together by new technolo-
gies, these transnationally linked organizations have had some notable
achievements, particularly in the protection of human rights. 20 Even
decades ago, the kind of "people power" generated by Helsinki Watch,
Charter 77, Solidarity, and other groups eventually created pressures for
human rights and an end to the Cold War from within the Warsaw Pact
countries themselves. Yet, while it seems clear that the public sector can
no longer function effectively without the cooperation and participation
of the private sector and the involvement of individual citizens, it
remains true that the private sector cannot solve all problems without
the infrastructure and coordination that states and international institu-
tions provide.
The importance of NGOs and private transnational networks func-
tioning as part of civil society caused UN Secretary-General Annan to
note: "We must also adapt international institutions, through which
states govern together, to the realities of the new era. We must form
coalitions for change, often with partners well beyond the precincts of
officialdom." 21 As Mary Kaldor observes, the elements of civil soci-
ety-voluntary associations, movements, parties, and unions, for exam-
ple-enable individuals "to act publicly."
22
We note that some transnational networks are built not exclusively
between private actors, but are actually bridges connecting officials in dif-
ferent governments. Such official, albeit informal, networks can play key
roles in ensuring the effectiveness of international standards. A prominent
current example is in the global effort to fight terrorism. Slaughter notes
that "public attention has focused on military cooperation, but the net-
works of financial regulators working to identify and freeze terrorist
assets, of law enforcement officials sharing vital information on terrorist
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suspects, and of intelligence operatives working to preempt the next
attack have been equally important. Networked threats require a net-
worked response." 23 One might expect such networks to become even
more prominent as globalized problems proliferate and traditional
mechanisms prove inadequate for regulating behavior.
Yet there are concerns about whether the international legal operat-
ing system can rely on these informal arrangements. First, the ad hoc
and selective character of these partnerships has caused concern about
the effectiveness and reliability of such arrangements as durable pillars
of global governance. Second is an exaggerated perception of the abil-
ity of NGOs and transnational networks to carry out a wide range of
operating system activities. The potential fragmentation in information,
resources, and decisionmaking may, in the long run, be a serious threat
to the order and authority that are requisite to civil society.
Despite these concerns, most scholars acknowledge the positive
influence NGOs and transnational networks have had on contemporary
international law in areas such as the well-being of individuals, human
rights, gender and race equality, environmental protection, sustainable
development, indigenous rights, nonviolent conflict resolution, partici-
patory democracy, social diversity, and social and economic justice.24 In
the broadest sense, we may be moving toward the point where effective
and sustained attention to these issues requires the political and finan-
cial mobilization of resources at all levels, from local to global. This is
where the voluntary, local, and issue-specific character of NGOs and
transnational networks make them a useful link between the subnational
community and national and international communities and institutions.
By providing a link, NGOs supplement the human and financial
resources of governments and intergovernmental organizations.
Legal Internalization
Traditional conceptions of the international legal operating system rely
on international institutions and processes to supervise norms. Yet, one
of the adaptations to inadequacies in this system is to rely on domestic
legal mechanisms to pick up the slack. This is described well by the
third component of Harold Koh's view of transnational legal process:
internalization: "Legal internalization occurs when an international
norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive
action, judicial interpretation, legislative action, or some combination of
the three .... Judicial internalization can occur when domestic litigation
provokes judicial incorporation of human rights norms either implicitly,
by construing existing statutes consistently with international human
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rights norms, or explicitly, through what I have elsewhere called 'trans-
national public law litigation'."
25
Some internalization is provided for within the confines of the
international legal operating system. When a treaty explicitly requires
national executing legislation to give norms effect domestically (e.g.,
rules on endangered species), then this can be considered an element of
the operating system. Still, unique features of national legal systems
leave much of the incorporation of international law to domestic legal
rules and processes, thus technically placing such adaptations outside
the rules of the international operating system. Furthermore, in other
stances, internalization happens independently of treaty provisions and
is stimulated by domestic political actors.
Legal internalization redresses problems with implementation or
enforcement in which some states are unwilling to follow the inter-
national norm. The problem may take place for a variety of legal, polit-
ical, social, or economic reasons. One response is legislative internal-
ization, when domestic lobbying embeds international law norms into
binding domestic legislation or even constitutional law that officials of
a noncomplying government must then obey as part of the domestic
legal fabric. Local actors then attain standing to press claims and seek
redress in domestic courts.
More recently, with the case of Osbaldo Torres v. the State of Okla-
homa before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, we see the effort
of domestic legal institutions to give effect to the decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mex-
ican Nationals.26 In its decision, one of the Oklahoma court's judges
acknowledged that the United States was bound by treaties, 27 in this
case, the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and that the court was therefore
bound to abide by the opinion in the Avena case.
28
The European Union (EU) represents a special case and one in
which internalization has gradually become more systematic. Anne-
Marie Slaughter and Walter Mattli described the process whereby Euro-
pean states have incorporated EU law into their own legal system:
"Until 1963 the enforcement of the Rome treaty [the constituent treaty
of the European Union], like that of any other international treaty,
depended entirely on action by the national legislatures of the member
states of the community. By 1965, a citizen of a community country
could ask a national court to invalidate any provision of domestic law
found to conflict with certain directly applicable provisions of the treaty.
By 1975, a citizen of an EC country could seek the invalidation of na-
tional law found to conflict with self-executing provisions of community
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secondary legislation, the 'directives' to national governments passed
by the EC Council of Ministers. And by 1990, community citizens
could ask their national courts to interpret national legislation consis-
tently with community legislation in the face of undue delay in passing
directives on the part of national legislatures." 29
The pioneering work in the development of a regional human rights
system that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
represents is a further important example of the interactions between
extranational and national systems of law. One of the more sweeping
recent examples is that of the British incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into its domestic law that "marks a dra-
matic shift in how individual rights are conceptualized under British
law. . . . The Human Rights Act, which puts courts and other public
authorities under a positive duty to 'give effect' to the rights enumerated
in the European Convention in their day-to-day activities, marks a shift
in the perception of civil liberties from residual freedoms to positive
rights." 3
0
The incorporation of international norms into domestic legal processes
has several advantages. Among the most notable is that the monitoring
and enforcement of the law is invested in national legal operating sys-
tems, all or most of which are more developed and better resourced than
the international system. This means that norms violations are more
likely to be detected, and most importantly there are established mech-
anisms for dealing with such violations. Although there has been a sig-
nificant increase over the last decade in the creation of international tri-
bunals, the international court system is still quite weak and structurally
limited when compared to its domestic counterparts. Indeed, one might
argue that legal internalization may, in some cases, be superior to inter-
national operating system equivalents.
Legal internalization, however, is not without its flaws or limita-
tions. First, internalization is probably most effective in monist legal
systems in which national and international law are part of the same
system. In addition, the adaptation is strongest in systems in which
some international laws may supercede national laws (e.g., Germany) as
opposed to those in which the national and international law are con-
sidered coequals (e.g., United States). Second, legal internalization as
an adaptation to operating system inadequacy is likely to be incomplete
when viewed from a global perspective. For internalization to be effec-
tive fully, it must take place in almost 200 different states. This is
unlikely, as some states will resist such actions and there is no assur-
ance that such internalizations will be consistent with the objects and
purposes of the international norms.
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Even if it were to occur universally, the lack of democratic processes
and legal mechanisms in many states will prevent international norms
from influencing the behavior of government officials. Authoritarian
states may be characterized by the lack of independent interest groups
to press for norm compliance or the ability of state officials to subvert
the legal process in order to avoid being held accountable for norm vio-
lations. There are instances, however, of states allowing access to their
national courts to hear claims that may have occurred outside the
boundaries of that state. Belgium has enacted universal jurisdiction pro-
visions that might allow it to prosecute Israeli prime minister Ariel
Sharon for actions during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, although Bel-
gium has recently limited its application. Furthermore, foreign plaintiffs
have relied on a 200-year-old US law, the Alien Tort Claims Act, to
make claims for actions that did not occur in the United States and did
not involve any US citizens. 31 Thus, there are even adaptations for other
failed adaptations to inadequacies in the international operating system.
Third, legal internalization may be ill-suited or irrelevant for interna-
tional norms that deal exclusively with the interactions between states,
absent an internal component. Thus, while in some sense these adapta-
tions are the ideal response to operating system failures, in practice they
are likely to be only a partial solution or a step to more permanent oper-
ating system change.
Domestic Legal and Political Processes
National safeguards are not a substitute for international regulation or
legal internalization, but when the latter fail or prove inadequate, regu-
lation can and does move to the national level. National safeguards fur-
ther come in two forms: the formal and the informal. Formal safeguards
are found in constitutions and national institutions such as legislatures,
courts, and budgets. 32 These institutions and their underlying processes
may provide disincentives or prohibitions against norm violation that
are independent of international influences but nevertheless effective.
For example, prohibitions against certain human rights violations may
be embedded in national law, and these may have been present even
before the development of a concomitant international norm.
Informal safeguards operate through political culture and public
opinion. 33 The effectiveness of these safeguards varies widely depending
on the strength of the domestic political system, including whether it is
democratic and how open it is to public debate. To the extent that inter-
national norms are shared by domestic audiences and/or are encased in
national cultures, there will be informal, but powerful, constraints on
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government officials to adhere to those norms. This may occur even if
national legal constraints are absent. Domestic constituencies may play
a critical role in the willingness of governments to comply with inter-
national agreements. 34 Governments will be especially responsive to
such influences when those constituencies can exercise electoral lever-
age on leading political officials (e.g., they are significant parts of the
government's political coalition) and/or they can provide extensive
information about their own state's compliance. European state compli-
ance with the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution convention can
largely be attributed to these elements.
35
National political and legal processes may also take on more promi-
nent roles in cases when international law appears inadequate to address
particular circumstances. When existing international standards and
structures are under stress, national debate and political process may
help fill the gap and set the criteria for action as well as the limits for
such operations. 36 For example, the closer the use of military force gets
to war, the more national systems play a role in the decision to take part
in such operations and to oversee them. This process, in turn, con-
tributes to shaping both the practice and scope of international action.
As the Panel on UN Peace Operations concluded in 2001, "The United
Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it
has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the
authorization of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter."37
The interactions of international and domestic decisionmaking
processes have been well recognized by international organization schol-
ars like Richard Cox and Harold Jacobson, who concluded in their classic
study of decisionmaking, The Anatomy of Influence, that the significance
of international organizations is better judged "not as how independent
they are of states, but how far they involve the effective policy-making
process of governments." 38 What debates over the 2003 war in Iraq now
tell us is that involving the effective policymaking processes of national
governments is no longer adequate in all cases. National decisionmaking
processes require certain levels of legitimacy that may now include
appropriate international authorization and standards.
As with other adaptations to international operating system gaps,
reliance on domestic political and legal processes is far from foolproof.
Similar to internalization, there will be considerable variance across
states with respect to national laws that serve to monitor and protect
international norms. In addition, we recognize that domestic audiences
and culture may not always be supportive of international norms; note
the divergence between international norms on the status of women and
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cultural views on female genital mutilation. Furthermore, government
officials may choose to ignore or circumvent domestic law or public
opinion in foreign policy. The rule of national law and the ability of
domestic audiences to sanction violators (at election time) is much
greater in democracies than in states that lack an independent judiciary
and mechanisms for public input into policy formulation.
Despite its limitations, relying on domestic legal and political
processes as substitutes for the international operating system has some
very attractive features. Most notably is that if international norms are
already protected in national legal systems and well embedded in national
culture and attitudes, international law may be almost self-enforcing.
Whether it has been providing the definitive interpretations of humani-
tarian intervention or preemptive action, the UN Charter system dealing
with the use of force has come under increasing stress since the end of
the Cold War in 1989. 39 Yet if the current structure of international insti-
tutions does not effectively address these questions, does this necessar-
ily mean the return to a self-judging and unregulated international secu-
rity system? Implicit in that question is the assumption that without
international regulation by international institutions, state behavior is
essentially unregulated. Such a conclusion would overlook the consid-
erable number of national safeguards that can exist at the state level to
protect against the wanton loss of lives and resources through military
operations that do not serve a state's interests. In some cases, there may
be little need for international operating system provisions, and there-
fore little concern if such mechanisms are absent or deficient. Perhaps
one of the most serious inadequacies of the present international oper-
ating system is in the area of the use of force.
"Soft Law" Mechanisms
Finally, but far from least important, are so-called soft law mechanisms
for ensuring norm compliance. Christine Chinkin points out that the
term soft law encompasses a wide range, but also that it is an increas-
ingly used tool:
There is a wide diversity in the instruments of so-called soft law which
makes the generic term a misleading simplification. Even a cursory
examination of these diverse instruments inevitably exposes their many
variables in form, language, subject matter, participants, addressees,
purposes, follow up and monitoring procedures. These variables, cou-
pled with the inherent contradictions in any concept of soft law, high-
light the challenges presented to the structure and substance of the tra-
ditional legal order by the increasing use of soft law forms.
40
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Despite the ambiguity, soft law mechanisms are broadly those that do
not involve a formal legal obligation or legal processes, but neverthe-
less represent a shared understanding or consensus about procedure or
behavior among the parties. In the context of the operating system,
informal or soft mechanisms for resolving jurisdictional disagreements
(e.g., how to resolve disputes when overlapping jurisdiction is present)
or disputes over substance (e.g., what diplomatic solutions are legit-
imized) represent soft law adaptations to inadequacies in "hard law"
provisions. A growing body of empirical work shows that such informal
mechanisms influence behavior.
41
As noted above, soft law mechanisms have multiple forms and pur-
poses and we cannot describe all those variations here. Nevertheless, for
illustration purposes, we describe a few of the ways in which soft law
fills the gaps left by its hard law counterparts. Soft law may provide for
both norms and their implementation when formal agreements are not
possible or involve issues that are heretofore considered domestic con-
cerns. For example, commodity agreements or the marketing of specific
products, such as breast milk substitutes, provide a way to monitor and
regulate behavior of international concern without resort to a treaty.42
Similarly, soft law is a vehicle to link international law to private entities
regulated principally by domestic law, such as individuals and trans-
national corporations.4 3 Soft law may also function as a supplement or
follow-up to traditional operating system mechanisms. Indeed, as in the
case of international environmental law, a treaty may provide for a frame-
work convention that can be followed by protocols that generate soft law
or practice to supplement the original text. Dinah Shelton explained that
"typically, the framework convention establishes a structure for further
co-operation between the parties through monitoring and implementation
procedures, exchanging data, and facilitating regulation." 44
Soft law fills in some gaps left by the formal operating system, but
why would actors choose to rely on the former, which are sometimes
ambiguous and may create multiple regimes? Kenneth Abbott and Dun-
can Snidal identify a number of advantages of soft law. 45 These include
lower contracting or negotiating costs, especially in comparison to long
and detailed legal agreements such as those concerning trade negotiated
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. Soft law also
entails fewer sovereignty costs, something that states may reluctantly
bear when signing hard legal agreements. States may also adopt soft
law provisions for norms in relatively new areas of international law
(e.g., forest principles), whose implementation effects cannot be easily
foreseen or for which rapid changes might be on the horizon (e.g., areas
of environmental law). Soft law provides greater flexibility because
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states do not risk creating operating system institutions that may be dif-
ficult to adapt or eliminate over time.46 Finally, soft law institutions and
processes may be the product of compromises when states desire a par-
ticular international norm but are reluctant to create the necessary oper-
ating system mechanisms that ensure its effect.
Despite the challenges, Chinkin observed that soft law is also a phe-
nomenon that is here to stay because international affairs have outpaced
the ability of the traditional lawmaking machinery "through international
organizations, specialized agencies, programmes, and private bodies that
do not fit the paradigm of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ." 47 We
may also find that over time, soft law may harden through practice or
through implementation by international or national institutions.
Conclusion
In this article, we began with a classification of the international legal
system into two component parts: normative systems and operating sys-
tems. The former refers to the often issue-specific prescriptions for
behavior in international law (e.g., good neighbor principle in environ-
mental law). The latter includes the mechanisms (e.g., jurisdiction rules,
courts) designed to ensure that the norms are implemented and ob-
served. We noted that a problem occurs when the operating system is
unable to promote (or is inefficient in promoting) the efficacy of certain
norms. The international legal system may persist in a state of subopti-
mality. The major portion of this article was dedicated to identifying
extrasystemic adaptations that have emerged to respond to the operat-
ing-normative system imbalance.
We see at least four different adaptations or governance mecha-
nisms, formally outside the international legal system, that supplement
or substitute for the operating component of that system: (1) NGOs and
transnational networks, (2) internalization of international law, (3)
domestic legal and political processes, and (4) soft law mechanisms. An
implicit assumption in some analyses is that such adaptations, while
valuable or even essential, are less desirable than a fully functioning oper-
ating system composed of purely international structures and processes.
There is some truth to that assumption, but it is too simplistic.
Extrasystemic adaptations do not fill all the gaps of the operating
system and cannot always substitute for effective international operat-
ing system components. Our analysis indicates that none of the four
adaptations alone is sufficient to ensure that international norms are
adopted and actors continue to adhere to their prescriptions. Even in
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combination, a number of holes remain. Furthermore, because some of
the adaptations are ad hoc, there is a tendency for periods of imbalance
to persist until actors react. In addition, such ad hoc measures are not
well suited for addressing new concerns or sudden changes in the inter-
national legal system. Finally, adaptations tend to be unevenly distrib-
uted across state members of the international legal system. Rarely will
certain adaptations (i.e., internalization) spread to all 190-plus states in
the world, leaving more of a patchwork of international norm compli-
ance than blanket coverage. One might presume that legal systems in
developed and democratic countries are more amenable to some adap-
tations than poorer and authoritarian governments. Still, it may not be
necessary for the operating system or the extrasystemic adaptations to
function perfectly; indeed, it is probably unrealistic to expect this. It
may be enough to achieve "acceptable" levels of compliance 48 in order
to achieve most of the goals of the normative system.
Despite their limitations, we also concluded that such adaptations
may be superior to operating system mechanisms in a number of in-
stances. For example, soft law mechanisms offered flexibility and greater
acceptability advantages for states, and this may make normative provi-
sions more likely to be adopted in the first place. Furthermore, reliance
on domestic legal and political institutions that are stronger and more
developed than international structures allows greater access for a range
of actors and more effective compliance mechanisms to ensure imple-
mentation of the norms. In areas in which international agreement is of
a framework or guiding principle character or in which the shape of an
international legal obligation is still in formation, such extralegal mech-
anisms may be useful precursors to more specific international stan-
dards and obligations.
Slaughter concluded that the international governance model of a
multipurpose international institution like the United Nations had at its
center built-in limits because "it requires a centralized rule-making
authority, a hierarchy of institutions, and universal membership." 49 In
place of this, she observes that governance has moved into a transgov-
ernmental order of "courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even
legislatures ... networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a
dense web of relations." 50 Drawing on examples from various sectors in
her book A New World Order, Slaughter argues that a transgovernmen-
tal order can provide a much more expandable and flexible system of
governance than is available through the classic system of states and
intergovernmental organizations. 51 Our analysis of the international
legal operating and normative systems suggests something quite similar.
To understand fully how international law functions today, one must
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look beyond traditional state-to-state or government-to-government legal
institutions, processes, and mechanisms. 0
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